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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most common adages is, “Learn from your mistakes.”  
Another is, “Everyone makes mistakes.”  The trouble-plagued Iowa State 
football player Jason Berryman put these together with the self-descriptive 
line, “You can’t learn from your mistakes if you run away from them.”1  The 
American champion of self-improvement Dale Carnegie proclaimed, “The 
successful man will profit from his mistakes and try again in a different 
way.”2  Yet another common adage states, “They are only mistakes if you 
don’t learn from them.”   
These timeless, if hackneyed, sentiments capture the purpose of this 
issue of the Pepperdine Law Review, which contains the published versions 
of papers delivered at the Law Review’s Supreme Mistakes symposium, held 
on April Fool’s Day, 2011, at Pepperdine University School of Law in 
Malibu, California.  It is our contention that the United States Supreme 
Court is no different from the rest of us when it comes to mistakes—it too 
makes them.  Yet when this supremely powerful institution makes mistakes, 
 
     * Hugh and Hazel Darling Chair in Law and University Professor of History, Pepperdine 
University; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979; Ph.D. in the History of Science, University of 
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 1.  Jason Berryman Quotes, THINKEXIST.COM, http://thinkexist.com/quotes/Jason_Berryman/ 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 2.  Dale Carnegie Training, CARNEGIEWORLD.BLOGSPOT.COM (Feb. 6, 2008), 
http://carnegieworld.blogspot.com/2008/02/successful-man-will-profit.html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2011). 
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they can have enormous consequences, as the articles contained in this issue 
show.3  If the Court is to learn from these mistakes and if American law is to 
profit from them then, as Berryman suggests, we should not run away from 
them.  We need to understand them so that the Court is less likely to make 
them again.  That is the purpose of this symposium issue.   
To organize a symposium centered on this theme, members of the Law 
Review, particularly Janelle M. White and Blake McKay Edwards, worked 
with members of the faculty and dean’s office to induce some of the nation’s 
top constitutional law scholars and historians to Malibu to discuss five of the 
most maligned Supreme Court decisions of all time.  From the outset, the 
concept was to have leading constitutional law experts each pick one case 
that could qualify as the Supreme Court’s worst or most notorious decision 
of all time.  Together, these so-called “Supreme Mistakes” would represent 
the symposium’s anti-canon of American constitutional law.  Given the 
limits of the symposium, we could invite only five outside speakers and five 
respondents.  Most of the respondents were drawn from the Pepperdine 
faculty.  The five outside speakers chose the cases; the respondents were 
limited by the choices of these outside speakers.  In addition, we invited one 
of the nation’s leading constitutional-law historians, G. Edward White, to 
provide his perspective on the overall issue.  From the way this symposium 
issue of the Review was conceived, its success rests largely on those 
speakers.   
 These speakers then revised their comments for publication in this issue 
of the Law Review.  The result is five main articles on single decisions, five 
short response articles, and one broad historical article.  In these articles, we 
seek to learn from the Supreme Court’s past mistakes about the limits of 
judicial power in the federal system and seek guidance about how the Court 
can anticipate and perhaps avert similar mistakes in the future.  Working 
with the student editors of each piece, let me introduce the five cases and the 
articles about them. 
 
 3.  See Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13 
(2011); Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred Scott: A Response to Daniel A. Farber, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 49 (2011); Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 75 (2011); Barry P. McDonald, A Reluctant Apology for Plessy: A Response to Akhil Amar, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 91 (2011); Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a Lost 
World, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 101 (2011); Edward J. Larson, Putting Buck v. Bell in Scientific and 
Historical Context: A Response to Victoria Nourse, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 119 (2011); Suzanna Sherry, 
Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 
(2011); Donald Earl Childress III, Redeeming Erie: A Response to Suzanna Sherry, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
155 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be 
Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 163 (2011); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Explaining Korematsu: A Response to 
Dean Chemerinsky, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 173 (2011); G. Edward White, Determining Notoriety in 
Supreme Court Decisions, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 197 (2011). 
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II.  THE CASES 
A.  Dred Scott v. Sandford4 
In his article, Professor Daniel A. Farber condemns Chief Justice Roger 
Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford for unnecessarily reaching out to 
brand blacks as eternally unequal to the legal status of whites and to bar any 
effort by Congress to control the spread of slavery into the 
territories.5  Farber charges that Taney’s decision represented an 
extraordinary case of presidential tampering with the judicial process and a 
breakdown in fair procedure within the Court itself.6  Despite the absurdity 
of Taney’s reasoning, his opinion created “constitutional tropes of racism, 
narrowing of federal power, and protection of property” that remained 
dominant in constitutional law for another seventy-five years.7  Dred 
Scott “did nothing to inject common sense or balance into the national 
debate” leading to the Civil War, Farber writes,8 but instead it injected fuel 
on the fire by settling the issue clearly on the side of the South.  According 
to Farber, “[N]ever has a judge gambled so badly for such high 
stakes.”9  Farber concludes that no other Supreme Court decision “contrived 
to fail across so many different dimensions—as an exercise in judicial 
overreaching, intellectual dishonesty, and disastrous statesmanship—and to 
do so in the defense of an institution whose very existence was a violation of 
human rights.”10 
Professor Paul Finkelman responds to Farber’s assertions by placing 
Dred Scott in its historical and constitutional context.11  The decision was 
constitutional under a regime that, prior to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments, legalized and protected slavery.12  Finkelman 
recognizes that while modern public sentiment rejects as outmoded any past 
decision promoting slavery, Justice Taney’s majority opinion in Dred Scott 
sprung from legislative, political, and common law grounds that undermine 
 
 4.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 5.  Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13, 14 
(2011). 
 6.  Id. at 15. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 38. 
 11.  See generally Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred Scott: A Response to Daniel A. 
Farber, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 49 (2011). 
 12.  Id. at 51–53. 
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Farber’s reasons for demonizing it.13  Although Dred Scott came at the apex 
of a long, nascent tension within the federal territories over how to resolve 
the slavery issue, Farber believes we as modern Americans do not hate the 
opinion because it was a poorly-reasoned decision of a racist judge that 
sparked the Civil War; we hate the opinion largely because we are 
embarrassed by (and often refuse to acknowledge) what America was in the 
antebellum period.14 
B.  Plessy v. Ferguson15 
In his article, which is an edited transcription of his symposium remarks, 
Professor Akhil Amar depicts Plessy v. Ferguson as one of the most reviled 
United States Supreme Court decisions of all time—and tries to explain why 
that is so.16  Indeed, he describes Plessy as a central case in an anti- or 
counter-canon of American law.17  This anti-canon, Amar notes, is made up 
of judicial decisions that stand in opposition to widely shared American 
values, such as equal opportunity and individual liberty.18  Plessy, he states, 
is such a decision.19  In his remarks, Amar discusses Justice John Harlan’s 
lone dissent in Plessy, noting that Harlan understood the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution to mean that all citizens are equal under the 
law, but that the majority opinion in Plessy allowed for unequal treatment of 
a racial minority under the law.20  Professor Amar argues that Harlan had an 
integrationist vision at that time, which is one that we eventually see 
reflected in various canonic documents of American history and law, such as 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech and Brown v. Board of 
Education.21   
In his response, Professor Barry P. McDonald argues that Plessy was 
virtually inevitable when placed in the historical and legal context of the late 
1800s.22  He writes that prevailing public opinion and social conditions at 
the time would not have supported official desegregation in the South.23  
Indeed, he adds, race relations were deteriorating dramatically in both the 
South and the North.24  At the time of Plessy, McDonald notes, existing 
 
 13.  Id. at 53. 
 14.  Id. at 72–73. 
 15.  163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 16.  Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75 (2011). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 76. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id. at 82, 86. 
 21.  Id. at 84–88. 
 22.  Barry P. McDonald, A Reluctant Apology for Plessy: A Response to Akhil Amar, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 91, 92–93 (2011). 
 23.  Id. at 93. 
 24.  Id. at 93–95. 
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Supreme Court precedent was not particularly protective of minority rights 
and lower court precedent of the day actively supported racial segregation in 
public facilities.25  He observes that the Court had no means, such as the 
purse or a police force, to enforce a progressive decision that was unpopular 
with the public and not supported by either the ruling state or federal 
administrations.26  In closing, McDonald concedes that while the 
Plessy decision seems inevitable when placed in context, Justice Henry 
Billings Brown’s opinion was still written in an insensitive and offensive 
way that should not be excused.27 
C.  Buck v. Bell28 
Professor Victoria Nourse selected Buck v. Bell as the Court’s worst 
decision.  By upholding Virginia’s compulsory sterilization law in 1927, she 
asserts that the Court reinvigorated the nation’s eugenics movement, leading 
to the forced sterilization of thousands of Americans.29  According to 
Nourse, Buck is a constitutional tragedy because it so easily could have 
come out the other way.30  At the time, many state courts were finding 
eugenic sterilization statutes unconstitutional, and the plain language of the 
Equal Protection Clause suggested that such laws were invalid.31  To 
understand Buck, Nourse suggests that we must look to an older era of 
constitutional jurisprudence where the state police power was seen as 
supreme, and even the most sacred individual rights could be sacrificed in 
the name of the health, safety, and welfare of society.32  Nourse argues that 
this era of constitutional law was fundamentally at odds with the plain 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, at the very least, forbids 
government recognition of a born aristocracy.33 
In response, I argue that, at the time the Supreme Court decided Buck in 
1927, eugenics was on the rise, not the decline.34  The American scientific 
and medical community broadly backed eugenic remedies for various forms 
 
 25.  Id. at 97–98. 
 26.  Id. at 93. 
 27.  Id. at 98–99. 
 28.  274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 29.  Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a Lost World, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 101, 103 (2011). 
 30.  Id. at 102–03. 
 31.  Id. at 102. 
 32.  Id. at 109–10, nn.63, 65. 
 33.  Id. at 116. 
 34.  Edward J. Larson, Putting Buck v. Bell in Scientific and Historical Context: A Response to 
Victoria Nourse, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 119, 120 (2011). 
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of mental illness and retardation.35  Legislatures, lawyers, and jurists took 
their cue from this scientific and medical consensus.36  Absent any question 
that the statute at issue in Buck was validly passed and that due process was 
provided for the persons subject to its reach, the law should have withstood 
constitutional challenge.37  The tragedy of Buck, I charge, was that Carrie 
Buck never received the due process guaranteed under Virginia’s eugenic 
sterilization statute and that neither her lawyers nor the courts protected her 
from a flagrant violation of her basic rights.38  Had due process been 
provided in this and other instances, while eugenics would still have been a 
scientific and medical mistake, it would not have been a legal one. 
E.  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins39 
Professor Suzanna Sherry’s article begins by setting forth criteria for 
assessing the worst Supreme Court decisions in history: (1) it must be 
wrong; (2) it must not be explainable as a product of its time; and (3) it must 
have lasting detrimental effects.40  Sherry argues that while all of the other 
cases discussed in this symposium issue may be wrong, Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins was worse than the others for two reasons.41  First, unlike the 
others, Erie was not explainable or excusable given its historical context.42  
Second, by shifting choice of law principles in federal courts, Erie has had a 
gravely deleterious impact on jurisprudence.43  In her article, Sherry 
discusses how the Court misinterpreted the Rules of Decision Act44 and 
contends that the Court and commentators seriously exaggerated the social 
and political defects of prior practice under Swift v. Tyson.45  In doing so, she 
explores the confusion surrounding the Court’s controversial basis for 
finding that Swift was unconstitutional.46 
Professor Donald Earl Childress’s response to Professor Sherry’s article 
redeems Erie by focusing on what the decision teaches us about 
federalism.47  The article begins by recognizing that the Erie decision 
 
 35.  Id. at 121–22. 
 36.  Id. at 122–24. 
 37.  Id. at 128. 
 38.  Id. at 119 n.3. 
 39.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 40.  Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All 
Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011). 
 41.  Id. at 130–32. 
 42.  Id. at 147–49. 
 43.  Id. at 149–52. 
 44.  Id. at 133–37. 
 45.  Id. at 137–38. 
 46.  Id. at 142–47. 
 47.  Donald Earl Childress III, Redeeming Erie: A Response to Suzanna Sherry, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
155, 157–58 (2011). 
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appears to “read more like an ex post rationalization than an application of 
well-settled principles of law.”48  The article points out that in application, 
however, there are rarely cases where the courts are confounded as to the 
right outcome.49  Problems arise when state law is unsettled or in the rare 
occasions where the line between substantive and procedural law is 
blurred.50  The article concludes by stating that although Erie may have been 
wrongly decided, it is redeemable by recognizing that it forces courts to take 
a step back and focus on sensitive federal and state issues.51 
E.  Korematsu v. United States52 
In the main article, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky makes three points.  First, 
he establishes the following criteria for assessing Supreme Court decisions: 
(1) social impact;53 (2) quality of the judgment’s crafting and reasoning;54 
and (3) impact of the decision on the development of the law.55  Next, he 
applies these criteria to Korematsu v. United States and finds that Korematsu 
stands as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions.56  Chemerinsky 
highlights how 110,000 Japanese-Americans were unfairly incarcerated 
without due process or compensation.57  In addition, Chemerinsky 
emphasizes how the Court erred in focusing solely on the ends that the 
government was seeking to achieve while ignoring the means.58  
Chemerinsky also explains how this pattern of restricting liberty in times of 
crisis existed throughout American history.59  Chemerinsky concludes this 
article by sharing a few important lessons: (1) no individual should ever be 
detained by the government without individualized suspicion that he or she 
has committed a crime;60 (2) the importance of remembering the role of race 
 
 48.  Id. at 157. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 159. 
 51.  Id. at 161. 
 52.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 53.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be 
Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2011). 
 54.  Id. at 165. 
 55.  Id. at 166. 
 56.  Id. at 166–70. 
 57.  Id. at 166. 
 58.  Id. at 168. 
 59.  Id. at 169–70. 
 60.  Id. at 170–71. 
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in decisions by government in American history;61 and (3) the Constitution 
should not be suspended in times of war or crisis.62 
In response to Dean Chemerinsky’s characterization of Korematsu as 
one of the worst Supreme Court decisions of all time and in spite of the 
widespread criticism of the decision, Professor Robert J. Pushaw Jr. explains 
the Court’s holding in light of its historical context.63  Instead of 
Chemerinsky’s three criteria analysis, Pushaw proposes a two-step “Neo-
Federalist” analysis64 for assessing what makes a Supreme Court decision a 
bad one.65  In particular, Pushaw addresses the inapplicability of 
Chemerinsky’s criteria to decisions involving military action66 and argues 
that Korematsu can be viewed as in line with other precedent recognizing 
the deference given to presidents during times of military crisis.67 
F.  Historical Perspective 
Professor G. Edward White notes in his historical essay, “The notorious 
decision ends up being one that is characterized as transcendentally 
mistaken.  Not only is it on the ‘wrong’ side of history, it gets no discount 
for the historical context in which it was decided.”68  He observes that 
notorious decisions like Dred Scott and Korematsu “share pernicious 
outcomes, a questionable institutional stance on the part of the Court, flawed 
legal reasoning, and, over time, a location on the wrong side of history.”69  
White suggests that the first three of these criteria are heavily dependent on 
the fourth and stresses that true notoriety only seems to affix itself to cases 
where “foundational wrongheadedness and transparently defective 
reasoning” were identified by contemporaries of the decision.70  In this 
respect, Professor White contrasts Lochner v. New York71 with Dred Scott 
and Korematsu by observing that Lochner may have escaped being chosen 
as one of the worst decisions in part because it was not derided by 
contemporaries, and obtained notoriety only when it was overturned during a 
 
 61.  Id. at 171–72. 
 62.  Id. at 172. 
 63.  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Explaining Korematsu: A Response to Dean Chemerinsky, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 173 (2011). 
 64.  Id. at 176.  For a detailed description and defense of the Neo-Federalist approach, see Robert 
J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 393, 397–99, 454, 470–72 (1996). 
 65.  Pushaw, supra note 63, at 176. 
 66.  Id. at 180–83. 
 67.  Id. at 183–94. 
 68.  G. Edward White, Determining Notoriety in Supreme Court Decisions, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
197, 198 (2011). 
 69.  Id. at 204. 
 70.  Id. at 211–12. 
 71.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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later era.72  Finally, Professor White applies his framework to United States 
v. Carolene Products Co.,73 acknowledging that few people would label it as 
notorious, and finds that despite its seemingly unsupported reversal of 
precedent, the decision is historically resonant with the mainstream political 
and economic attitudes of Americans in the 1930s—showing that historical 
discounting seems to increase the stature of the decision.74   
III.  CONCLUSIONS 
By including Lochner along with Dred Scott and the other decisions 
subject to current censure, Professor White illustrates the difficulty of 
establishing a lasting anti-canon of American constitutional law.  When I 
was in law school in the 1970s, any listing of Supreme Court mistakes surely 
would have included Lochner.  This point is underscored by Professor Jamal 
Greene’s recent survey of fifty-four U.S. law review articles from the past 
quarter century that make reference to anti-canonical legal texts: he found 
that only four Supreme Court decisions were listed as “anticanon or 
antiprecedent” by more than two authors.75  Remember that Greene’s survey 
covers a period reaching back nearly to my law school days and does not 
necessarily capture current opinion.76  Of the four notorious decisions 
identified by Greene’s survey, only Lochner is not on today’s docket.77  Why 
not?  Has it fallen into favor?  Unlike the characters in Dante’s Inferno, who 
are doomed to remain there forever, can the decisions in what Akhil Amar 
has characterized as “the lowest circle of constitutional hell” change over 
time?78  Are we really talking about a constitutional purgatory rather than 
eternal damnation?  Could grace abound even to the chief of sinners?  Points 
raised in the response articles suggest that the answer in many cases could be 
“yes” on all counts.  Lochner’s absence does so as well. 
During the mid-twentieth century, Lochner was despised for many 
reasons.  In that 1905 decision, a bare majority of the Supreme Court struck 
down a popular state statute limiting persons employed as bakers (but not 
self-employed bakers) to working no more than sixty hours per week.79  The 
 
 72.  White, supra note 68, at 210–12. 
 73.  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 74.  White, supra note 68, at 215–21. 
 75.  Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776488. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. (manuscript at 7) (on file with Harvard Law Review). 
 79.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 10 
law, the Court declared, violated employers’ and employees’ liberty of 
contract under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.80  As such, 
Lochner came to represent the extension of substantive due process to an 
economic right not enumerated in the Constitution.81  Lochner was not the 
first or last decision to do so, however.  It gained infamy mostly because of 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s memorable dissent, which cast the 
majority’s ruling as a damnable act of anti-democratic judicial activism in 
support of anti-progressive Gilded Age business interests.82  “I think that the 
word ‘liberty,’ in the 14th Amendment, is perverted when it is held to 
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,” Holmes declared.83  
“The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics.”84  Explaining the decision’s anti-canonical status, Yale 
constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman wrote in 1991, “For the 
overwhelming majority of today’s Americans, Lochner’s constitutional 
denunciation of a maximum hours law, limiting bakers to a sixty (!) hour 
workweek, speaks in an alien voice.”85 
The absence of Lochner from today’s program suggests that academic 
opinion on even that much-reviled decision may be undergoing some 
revision.  At least two reasons spring to mind.  First, at a time when there are 
perhaps more economic conservatives and libertarians in think tanks, at law 
schools, and on the Supreme Court than at any time since the early 1930s 
when Lochner was widely followed, one would expect to find at least some 
of them disposed to defend the proposition that liberty of contract stands 
among the individual rights protected against limitation by the states under 
the Due Process Clause.  Within the academia, for example, Richard 
Epstein, James Ely, David Bernstein, Alan Meese, David Strauss, and Randy 
Bartlett have come to Lochner’s defense in recent years.86  Second, some 
mainline or liberal legal scholars who favor using the Due Process Clause to 
protect un-enumerated social or political rights (perhaps including privacy) 
have shown some willingness to rethink Lochner’s use of it to protect an un-
enumerated economic right.87  “A case that is right about the existence of 
 
 80.  Id. at 53. 
 81.  See Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeymen Bakers of New York: The Journeymen 
Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 413, 417 (1994). 
 82.  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 83.  Id. at 76. 
 84.  Id. at 75. 
 85.  1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 64 (1991). 
 86.  See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Univ. of Chi. Press 2011); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW 
PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (Cato Inst. Publ’g 2006); David A. Strauss, Why Was 
Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (2003); Alan J. Meese & Nate B. Oman, The End of an 
Idea: Progressive Constitutionalism Is a Dead End, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (July 5, 2010, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/243396/end-idea-alan-j-meese (last visited Oct. 21, 
2011). 
 87.  See Greene, supra note 75. 
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unenumerated rights but wrong about just what substantive due process 
guarantees seems a poor candidate for the anticanon,” Jamal Greene 
concluded in the forthcoming Harvard Law Review article.88  Others have 
made similar comments. 
As we consider the arguments contained in the five main articles 
published in this symposium issue of the Pepperdine Law Review—each one 
condemning a different opinion to the anti-canon of American law—perhaps 
the absence of Lochner should give us a reason to reflect on the defenses 
raised by the respondents.  Although I cannot presently conceive of how 
some of these decisions could ever be redeemed, I would have said the same 
thing about Lochner during my law school days.  But then I have heard that 
even Stalin is undergoing something of a rehabilitation in Russia and Jean-
Claude Duvalier has been welcomed back to Haiti.  One never knows how 
time will change one’s perspectives. 
  
 
 88.  Id. at 39. 
 12 
*** 
 
